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DIPLOMATS OR DEFENDANTS? DEFINING
THE FUTURE OF HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY
MICHAEL A. TUNKS
INTRODUCTION
The question of when a country’s highest leaders may be haled
before a foreign nation’s civil or criminal courts to stand trial has long
been a murky and unsettled area of law.1 In the past year, however,
international and American courts have crafted a relatively clear and
consistent answer.
In two seminal cases, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
a U.S. federal district court recognized the immunity of the Congo’s
Foreign Minister Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi2 and Zimbabwe’s
President Robert Mugabe.3 These decisions establish a coherent
framework for deciding difficult and politically sensitive questions of
immunity that addresses the competing goals of promoting interna-
tional discourse, respecting the sovereign equality of states, and en-
suring accountability for serious international crimes. By establishing
clear and predictable rules that define when a state’s leaders may
travel abroad freely without fear of arrest, this framework promises
Copyright © 2002 by Michael A. Tunks.
1. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, International Law Advocacy and Its Discontents, 2 CHI. J.
INT’L L. 475, 479 (2001) (discussing the sources of confusion about head-of-state immunity); Jo-
seph W. Dellapenna, Civil Remedies for International Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 169, 190
(1999/2000) (suggesting that “if there is such a thing as ‘head-of-state immunity,’ . . . the mean-
ing and scope of that immunity remains completely unclear”); Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and
Sovereign and Individual Immunities (Sovereign Immunity, Act of State, Head-of-State Immunity
and Diplomatic Immunity)—Some Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 467, 475–76 (1999)
(discussing the unsettled nature of head-of-state immunity under U.S. law); Peter Evan Bass,
Note, Ex-Head-of-State Immunity: A Proposed Statutory Tool of Foreign Policy, 97 YALE L.J.
299, 306 (1987) (proposing solutions to “supplant the current confusion” over head-of-state im-
munity); Shobha Varughese George, Note, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States Courts:
Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1061 (1995) (explaining the
“current confusion plaguing head-of-state immunity”).
2. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 41 I.L.M. 536, 549–50, 551–52 (2002)
(recognizing the immunity of Yerodia).
3. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 296–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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to improve nations’ ability to conduct crucial diplomatic functions.
Moreover, it provides states with certain means of bringing to justice
world leaders who violate fundamental principles of international law
and basic human decency.
Part I of this Note examines the origins of the head-of-state im-
munity doctrine, a history that proves crucial in analyzing why some
aspects of the doctrine have been discarded while others have been
retained. Parts II and III discuss the law of head-of-state immunity
under international law and U.S. law, respectively, and describe the
developments that have affected the head-of-state immunity doctrine
in the past year. Part IV identifies the framework of head-of-state
immunity law synthesized in these two recent cases, demonstrates
that this framework is a responsible balance between the interests of
diplomacy and justice, and suggests ways in which this framework al-
lows the United States to seek accountability for international crimes
while preserving strong protection for the leaders of the United States
and our allies.
I.  HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY: ORIGINS AND POLICIES
The principle of head-of-state immunity originally developed
from the idea of state sovereign immunity, as the state and its ruler
used to be deemed one and the same.4 Yet the treatment afforded to
heads of state and other top state officials5 has also been strongly in-
fluenced by the principle of diplomatic immunity, and the three con-
cepts have by now evolved into doctrines wholly distinct from one
another.6 Nevertheless, to understand the dramatic recent changes in
the law of head-of-state immunity, it is essential to examine these
closely related doctrines from which the idea of head-of-state immu-
nity descended, and to explore their underlying rationales.
4. Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State Immunity: The Defined
Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170 (1986).
5. The head-of-state immunity doctrine protects not only heads of state, but also heads of
government and certain other top state officials, including foreign ministers. See Lafontant v.
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that the “determination of who qualifies
as a head-of-state is made by the Executive Branch”). The question of precisely which govern-
ment officials are protected by head-of-state immunity is outside the scope of this Note.
6. See Mallory, supra note 4, at 170–71 (“[D]espite their common origin, head-of-state
immunity and sovereign immunity have evolved into separate legal constructs.”).
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A. State Sovereign Immunity
Rules of sovereign immunity govern the extent to which a state
may claim to be free from the jurisdiction of a foreign nation’s courts.7
Historically, international law recognized a principle of absolute im-
munity for sovereign states, under which no state could be put on trial
without its consent.8 This rule reflected the fundamental premise that
all states are independent and equal under international law, and the
notion that subjecting a state to a foreign court’s jurisdiction would be
inconsistent with the idea of sovereign equality.9 But as countries be-
came more and more involved in commercial activities, international
law shifted toward a concept of restrictive sovereign immunity,10 un-
der which a state retains immunity from lawsuits based on its official
public acts, but may be subject to a foreign state’s jurisdiction re-
garding claims arising out of its private acts, such as commercial be-
havior.11 By consenting to these new standards, states adapted the law
of sovereign immunity to fit a changing world in which national gov-
ernments played more expansive roles outside the sphere of what had
traditionally been considered public action.12 The shift to restrictive
sovereign immunity allowed international law to adjust to more ex-
tensive state commercial activity without unduly interfering with the
goals of state sovereign equality and independence.13
B. Diplomatic Immunity
Diplomatic immunity, in contrast, gives a form of restrictive im-
munity to the official agents of a diplomatic staff.14 Diplomatic agents
7. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW 118 (7th ed. 1997).
8. Id. at 119.
9. Id. at 118; see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
10. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 119. Restrictive sovereign immunity is also commonly
referred to as qualified sovereign immunity.
11. Mallory, supra note 4, at 173.
12. Most countries, including the United States, have adopted the restrictive view of sover-
eign immunity, either through legislation or in the courts. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 119.
However, some countries, most notably South American countries, continue to adhere to the
older absolute sovereign immunity rules. Id.
13. See id. at 120 (discussing policies motivating the shift to restrictive sovereign immu-
nity).
14. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 29–38, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
3240–45, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 110–18.
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are considered inviolable and not subject to arrest;15 they are abso-
lutely immune from criminal prosecution16 and they are immune from
civil suits except when the action relates to their private property or
their private commercial activities outside the scope of their official
functions.17 Yet the immunity still belongs to the state, not to the dip-
lomat, and it may be waived if the sending state desires.18
The most powerful justification for diplomatic immunity is func-
tional necessity: in the absence of such immunity, diplomats would
not be able to effectively represent their countries, and international
relations in turn would suffer.19 The leading treaty in this field, the Vi-
enna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, endorses the idea of func-
tional necessity by explaining that the treaty’s goal is to develop
friendly relations between nations and stressing that the purpose of
diplomatic immunity is “to ensure the efficient performance of the
functions of diplomatic missions.”20
C. Head-of-State Immunity
Head-of-state immunity has sought to achieve the goals of both
sovereign and diplomatic immunity by (1) recognizing an appropriate
degree of respect for foreign leaders as a symbol of their state’s sov-
ereign independence; and (2) ensuring that they are not inhibited in
performing their diplomatic functions. Heads of state who travel
abroad perform crucial and unique diplomatic tasks, and, therefore, a
principal purpose of head-of-state immunity is to allow state leaders
freely to conduct diplomacy in foreign countries.21 Moreover, ensuring
15. Id. art. 29, 23 U.S.T. at 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. at 110.
16. Id. art. 31, 23 U.S.T. at 3240, 500 U.N.T.S. at 112.
17. Id.
18. Id. art. 32, 23 U.S.T. at 3241, 500 U.N.T.S. at 112.
19. See Joshua D. Groff, A Proposal for Diplomatic Accountability Using the Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court: The Decline of an Absolute Sovereign Right, 14 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 209, 216 (2000) (discussing functional necessity as “the most popular” justification
for diplomatic immunity); Lori J. Shapiro, Foreign Relations Law: Modern Developments in
Diplomatic Immunity, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 281, 283 (1990) (exploring the theoretical bases
for diplomatic immunity). Other theories that have been offered to explain the doctrine of dip-
lomatic immunity include: (1) a vision of a diplomat as a personification of the sending state’s
sovereign; and (2) extraterritoriality—a legal fiction that a diplomat who travels abroad remains
in his home country for legal purposes. Id. at 282.
20. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 14, preamble, 23 U.S.T. at
3230, 500 U.N.T.S. at 96.
21. See Mallory, supra note 4, at 179 (“Each state, with the expectation of being accorded
similar treatment, grants foreign heads of state at least the degree of immunity necessary for
them to perform their duties within that state without being subject to detention or arrest.”).
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that heads of state may travel freely abroad serves the traditional
aims of sovereign immunity, because subjecting a state’s leader to the
jurisdiction of a foreign court infringes to some degree on that state’s
sovereignty.
Historically, heads of state—like states themselves—were abso-
lutely immune for acts committed either in a public or a private ca-
pacity, and therefore many countries felt no practical need to distin-
guish between head-of-state immunity and state sovereign immunity.22
But as the international community moved toward a restrictive form
of sovereign immunity, stripping away a state’s immunity for private
or commercial acts, it became unclear whether the doctrine of head-
of-state immunity would follow that course as well, or whether inter-
national law would preserve a greater degree of personal inviolability
for world leaders.23 The shift to restrictive sovereign immunity demon-
strated that the policies justifying that doctrine could in some in-
stances be outweighed by other important state interests. Granting
immunity to heads of state was justified in part by these very same
policies, but also by functional diplomatic considerations. Conse-
quently, nations began thinking about head-of-state immunity as a
distinct legal concept, and recognized the need to reconsider the ex-
tent to which the goals of sovereign equality and functional necessity
together could justify exempting heads of state from judicial process
abroad.24
A strong head-of-state immunity doctrine would prevent states
from bringing some violators of the most serious international crimes
to justice, a consequence that seemed at odds with the international
community’s ever-increasing focus on protecting fundamental human
22. See MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 118–19 (discussing head-of-state immunity as part of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
23. See Mallory, supra note 4, at 179 (discussing the “absence of a legal standard for deter-
mining when heads of state are entitled to immunity” ).
24. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 135–37 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (explaining
that the codification of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the United States in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act did not codify the law of head-of-state immunity, and as-
serting that “the view that the FSIA is inapplicable to a head-of-state comports with both the
history of the FSIA and the underlying policy of comity”); Amber Fitzgerald, The Pinochet
Case: Head-of-State Immunity Within the United States, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 987, 1006 (2001)
(“The end result has been that the enactment of the FSIA divided the principles of sovereign
immunity and head-of-state immunity.”).
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rights.25 As the international legal system at the close of the twentieth
century concentrated increasingly on safeguarding human rights,
states consented to accept some limitations on their sovereignty to
ensure more accountability for violations of these basic norms.26 In
addition, bestowing immunity upon heads of state can give human
rights violators an incentive to keep power at all costs to retain the
cloak of immunity that runs with the office, particularly if former
heads of state are not entitled to the same benefits. Motivated by the
desire for accountability, many state policymakers weighing the bene-
fits of immunity against the interests of justice, decided it would be
best to whittle away at the shield of immunity historically enjoyed by
heads of state.27
On the other hand, immunity from foreign jurisdiction has been
recognized throughout human history as an essential tool in con-
ducting foreign affairs.28 Head-of-state immunity allows a nation’s
leader to engage in his official duties, including travel to foreign coun-
tries, without fearing arrest, detention, or other treatment inconsis-
tent with his role as the head of a sovereign state.29 Without the guar-
antee that they will not be subjected to trial in foreign courts, heads of
state may simply choose to stay at home rather than assume the risks
of engaging in international diplomacy abroad. For example, when
Belgium began publicly entertaining the idea of bringing Ariel
Sharon to trial, the Israeli Prime Minister was essentially unable to
visit the European Union Headquarters in Brussels,30 and Israeli legal
25. See Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: Bringing Hu-
man Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191, 206 (1997) (“In order for human rights pro-
tections to have any real meaning, they must be enforced; if violators escape punishment, the
prohibitions are merely declaratory.”).
26. See id. at 205 (explaining that the erosion of state sovereignty was the price paid for the
creation of a legal regime based on respect for international human rights).
27. See Joseph W. Dellapena, International Decisions, Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp.
128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 528, 531–32 (1994) (arguing that the interests of justice
are paramount in cases where a state or a state official is engaged in private or commercial acts).
28. See Groff, supra note 19, at 213 (tracing the history of diplomatic immunity to ancient
Greek city-states and to Biblical times); Numbers 21:21–22 (Revised Standard) (“Then Israel
sent messengers to Sihon king of the Amorites, saying: ‘Let me pass through your land; we will
not turn aside into field or vineyard; we will not drink the water of a well; we will go by the
King’s Highway, until we have passed through your territory.’”).
29. See Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 1002 (discussing the role of head-of-state immunity in
promoting international respect in foreign relations).
30. Sharon ‘War Crimes’ Hearing Delayed, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
middle_east/1577630.stm (Oct. 3, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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advisors began compiling a list of nations that purported to exercise
universal jurisdiction over criminal offenses in such a manner.31
Moreover, supporters of head-of-state immunity feared that the
decay of the immunity doctrine would lead to the increased use of
civil and criminal lawsuits as a weapon against unpopular political
figures. Israeli Attorney General Elyakim Rubenstein, without pro-
viding details, claims to have many clear indications that lawsuits
against Sharon and other top Israeli officials are “conducted in the
context of a premeditated campaign involving people with clear po-
litical interests.”32 Likewise, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger has been very critical of attacks on the traditional head-of-
state immunity doctrine, and reports indicate that Kissinger himself is
reluctant to travel in several countries.33 Kissinger argues that the in-
ternational legal system should not develop into “a way of conducting
political battles [where] the various contestants will pursue each other
in courts around the world.”34
II.  HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
At the close of the twentieth century, international law increas-
ingly began to identify situations in which heads of state would not be
entitled to immunity in foreign courts. Correspondingly, it became
quite unclear to states and scholars what still remained of the tradi-
tional head-of-state immunity doctrine in modern times. In 2002, the
ICJ stepped in to resolve the debate, providing a relatively clear and
authoritative framework for deciding head-of-state immunity cases
under international law.
31. Herb Keinon, Israel Compiling List of States With ‘Universal Jurisdiction’, JERUSALEM
POST, July 27, 2001, at 4A. Moreover, because immunity is based on international comity, any
state that stops recognizing a foreign leader’s immunity cannot expect its own leader to be
shielded from lawsuits while traveling abroad, even when in countries that generally respect the
immunity of foreign heads of state. See Mallory, supra note 4, at 169 (“[A] state’s ability to grant
or deny immunity is generally restrained only by considerations of reciprocity, that is, how other
states will, in turn, treat its alien in their territory.”).
32. Keinon, supra note 31, at 4A (quoting Elyakim Rubenstein, Attorney General, Israel).
33. See All Things Considered: New Trend Toward Universal Jurisdiction (National Public
Radio broadcast, Aug. 8, 2001), 2001 WL 9435868 (noting that authorities in Chile, Argentina,
and France all want Kissinger to testify about human rights violations that took place in Chile
under the Pinochet regime when the U.S. was supporting that dictatorship).
34. Id.
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A. The State of International Law before the Yerodia Case
During the past few years, the international law of head-of-state
immunity has evolved at an astoundingly rapid pace.35 No treaty has
been signed to clarify or alter head-of-state immunity law; instead, the
law has changed through the development of international custom.36
International customary law consists of two basic elements: objective
state practice, and states’ subjective belief that their behavior is
obligatory under international law, an element known as opinio ju-
ris.37 Therefore, to monitor the development of the customary law of
head-of-state immunity, one should analyze how national and inter-
national courts have addressed recent immunity questions, how states
have reacted to these decisions, what actions political branches have
taken with respect to immunity issues, and any general statements na-
tions have made about the degree of immunity enjoyed by heads of
state.38
Recent state practice has drawn a sharp distinction between for-
mer heads of state and current heads of state, as courts across the
world have been much more willing to subject former leaders to their
jurisdiction.39 After British authorities arrested former Chilean dicta-
35. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights
Litigation, 97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2130 (1999) (discussing the “growing tension between the in-
ternational law principle of sovereign equality and the quest for universal justice” that sur-
rounds the question of head-of-state immunity); Mallory, supra note 4, at 179 (noting the cur-
rent confusion that surrounds the issue, and stating that “since there is no agreement on the
degree of immunity that attaches to the status of head of state, there is no applicable standard
that can be viewed as customary international law”).
36. International custom is recognized as one of the four sources of international law. Stat-
ute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38, para. 1, 59 Stat. 1031, 1060. The
other recognized sources are treaties, general principles of law, and the writings of judges and
scholars as a subsidiary source. Id.
37. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 97 (June 27); see
also Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, 276–77 (Nov. 20) (noting that a rule of cus-
tomary international law must derive from constant and uniform usage); MICHAEL BYERS,
CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1999) (explaining that the opinio juris element establishes that “only
that behaviour which is considered legally relevant is regarded as capable of contributing to the
process of customary international law”).
38. See MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 39:
The main evidence of customary law is to be found in the actual practice of states,
and a rough idea of a state’s practice can be gathered from . . . reports of actions
taken by states, and from statements made by government spokesmen . . . and also
from a state’s laws and judicial decisions.
39. See, e.g., Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendary Magistrate, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 205–06
(H.L. 1999) (denying immunity to Pinochet and allowing the extradition process to proceed on
charges of torture in pursuance to a conspiracy to commit torture).
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tor Augusto Pinochet, on an international arrest warrant issued by
Spain, Pinochet, who had traveled to London for back surgery, at-
tempted to resist extradition based on his status as a former head of
state.40 The British Law Lords denied him immunity for acts of torture
committed after 1988, when the Torture Convention came into effect
in the United Kingdom.41 Even though the ruling was decided on nar-
row grounds,42 for most scholars it sounded the death knell for head-
of-state immunity for international crimes with respect to former
heads of state, even when the crimes were perpetrated while the
leader was in office.43 While former heads of state still retain immu-
nity for the official acts they committed while in power, they enjoy no
protection for their international crimes, because such serious abuses
cannot fall within the scope of a head of state’s legitimate functions.44
Even though Pinochet served as a head of state at the time, interna-
tional law deems acts of torture so far outside the bounds of legiti-
mate state action that he must be considered a private actor with re-
spect to such conduct.45
The abrogation of immunity for the private acts of former heads
of state, including international crimes in any context, is in harmony
with the twin purposes of the head-of-state immunity doctrine: re-
specting state sovereign equality and promoting diplomatic functions.
Because crimes against humanity, torture, and other international
crimes are outside the scope of what can be considered a state’s offi-
cial public functions, seeking accountability for these acts does not in-
40. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 2133.
41. See Michael Byers, The Law and Politics of the Pinochet Case, 10 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 415, 434 (2000) (explaining that the final Law Lords ruling was based on the Torture
Convention, not on international custom); Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 1001 (discussing the rati-
fication of the Torture Convention). Yet even if the abrogation of former head-of-state immu-
nity had not already become customary law by the date of the Pinochet decision, the decision
itself certainly contributed mightily toward the development of this international customary
rule. Eventually, U.K. Home Secretary Jack Straw decided not to extradite Pinochet on other
grounds—Pinochet had fallen severely ill and was not fit to stand trial. Byers, supra, at 438.
42. See Byers, supra note 41, at 434 (describing the “conservative” nature of the ruling).
43. See Charles Pierson, Pinochet and the End of Immunity: England’s House of Lords
Holds that a Former Head of State Is Not Immune for Torture, 14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 263,
326 (2000) (declaring that no immunity exists for former heads of state for crimes against hu-
manity).
44. See id. at 323 (reporting that a majority of the Law Lords in the Pinochet case found
that acts performed by state officials under the color of state law are not necessarily state acts
when the conduct violates international law).
45. See id. at 299 (“International law, as reflected in state practice, has rejected torture and
taking of hostages as official functions of governments.”).
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fringe on a state’s sovereignty, or at least not so much as to outweigh
the benefits of stronger human rights enforcement. This is exactly the
rationale that led to the adoption of restrictive sovereign immunity
for states,46 and nothing suggests that the goal of protecting state sov-
ereign equality should favor a nation’s head of state over the state it-
self. Furthermore, holding former heads of state accountable for their
international crimes does not interfere with the goal of promoting
diplomatic functions, because exercising jurisdiction over a former
leader would not prevent current diplomats from traveling abroad
and would not otherwise unduly disrupt international relations.47
Much more controversy has surrounded the law of head-of-state
immunity for current leaders, and at least some state practice has
emerged that suggests abrogating immunity even for sitting world
leaders, at least for the most serious international offenses.48 A Bel-
gian lawsuit alleging that Israeli head of state Ariel Sharon took part
in a 1982 massacre of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and a suit in
response against Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat for a series of mur-
ders and bombings in Israel serve as prominent examples.49 Sensing
the possibility of using the Belgian courts as a forum to try state lead-
ers, a group of Cuban exiles followed suit, bringing a civil action
against Fidel Castro in Belgium based on allegations of torture, per-
secution, and false imprisonment.50
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome
Statute), a multilateral treaty, lent even more force to the argument
that sitting head-of-state immunity was eroding under customary in-
ternational law. The Rome Statute explicitly denies immunity to
heads of state, declaring that “official capacity as a Head of State or
46. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
47. E.g., In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a
lawsuit against former Philippine head of state Marcos regarding private acts he engaged in
while serving as head of state “does not implicate any of the foreign diplomatic concerns in-
volved in bringing suit against another government in United States courts”).
48. See Cuban Exiles Act Against Castro, CNN.com, at http://europe.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/10/04/belgium.castro/ (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(naming Cuban President Fidel Castro, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, and Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein as heads of state who at the time faced possible trials in Belgium for interna-
tional crimes).
49. Chris Morris, Arafat Lawsuit Filed in Belgian Court, BBC News, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1679044.stm (Nov. 27, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). A representative of the group filing suit has said that the group’s members decided to
file suit in Belgium after they saw how the court reacted to the complaint against Sharon. Id.
50. Cuban Exiles Act Against Castro, CNN.com, at http://europe.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/
europe/10/04/belgium.castro/ (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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Government . . . shall in no case exempt a person from criminal re-
sponsibility under this Statute.”51 United Nations (UN) Secretary
General Kofi Annan echoed that the goal of the International Crimi-
nal Court (ICC) is to “ensure that no ruler, no State, no junta, and no
army anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity.”52 The Rome
Statute provides for jurisdiction when the defendant’s state is a party
to the treaty, or when the crime took place on the territory of a state
party.53 When the defendant head of state is a national of a state party
to the treaty, head-of-state immunity is not really abrogated; rather,
the state that holds the immunity has merely waived it in advance or
delegated its power to try its own leaders.54 However, when the pro-
posed court’s jurisdiction is based simply on a delegation from states
with territorial jurisdiction,55 the ICC, according to the plain text of
the Rome Statute, purports to claim jurisdiction over heads of state of
nations that have not consented to the court’s jurisdiction.56
The Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR) also provide that
51. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 27, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999, 1010.
52. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, UN.org, at http://www.un.
org/law/icc/general/overview.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2002) (emphasis added).
53. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 51, art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at
1017. The treaty also recognizes that the UN Security Council would have the power to refer a
dispute to the ICC even if the conditions in Article 12 are not met. Id. art. 13, 37 I.L.M at 1012;
see also infra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
54. Cf. Pierson, supra note 43, at 273 (“Head-of-state immunity exists to protect states, not
individual leaders.”).
55. See Madeline Morris, The Democratic Dilemma of the International Criminal Court, 5
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 591, 594 (2002) (“[T]he ICC’s jurisdiction arises from the delegation of
jurisdiction by the states parties.”); See generally Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Miscon-
ceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (Winter 2001) (ex-
amining whether states have any power to delegate criminal jurisdiction to international tribu-
nals).
56. Although this claim is further limited only to instances in which the country of the head
of state is unable or unwilling to genuinely prosecute or investigate the allegations, it still marks
significant state practice purporting to abrogate the immunity of sitting heads of state. See gen-
erally Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 51, art. 17, 37 I.L.M. at
1012.
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sitting heads of state are not immune before those tribunals.57 Yet
these statutes lend little support to the development of a general in-
ternational customary rule, since they were authorized by the UN Se-
curity Council under its Chapter VII powers to deal with specific
threats to international peace and security.58 The ICTY and ICTR
Statutes do not recognize a general change in the international law of
head-of-state immunity; on the contrary, the Security Council has
authorized a limited abrogation of the customary rule for a specific
purpose, namely to restore international peace and security in two
unstable regions. Because states consented to give the Security Coun-
cil this power in the UN Charter, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes do not
change the principle that no head of state may be put on trial without
the consent of his home country.59
Recent state practice also presents a number of examples that
suggest that the doctrine of immunity for current heads of state is still
alive and well, even with respect to the most serious international
crimes. In March, 2001, France’s highest court, the Cour de Cassation,
held that Libyan head of state Muammar el-Qaddafi was entitled to
immunity in a suit alleging that Qaddafi was responsible for bombing
57. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 7, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827/Annex (1993), re-
printed in 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1194 (“The official position of any accused person, whether as Head
of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person of
criminal responsibility . . . .”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 6,
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute] (same). Indeed, the ICTY has exercised its jurisdiction over former Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic on war crimes and genocide charges arising out of the conflicts in
Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. See generally Joseph Lelyveld, The Defendant: Slobodan
Milosevic’s Trial, and the Debate Surrounding International Courts, NEW YORKER, May 27,
2002.
58. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 29, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827
(1993) (establishing the ICTY under its Chapter VII powers, and determining that ethnic
cleansing in the former Yugoslavia constituted a threat to international peace and security); S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (1994) (establishing
the ICTR under its Chapter VII powers, and determining that genocide and other large-scale
human rights abuses in Rwanda caused a threat to international peace and security).
59. Article 39 grants the Security Council the power to determine the existence of a threat
to the peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. After mak-
ing that subjective determination, the Security Council has the extremely broad power under
Article 41 to implement any measures it deems appropriate, not involving the use of force, to
restore international peace and security. Id. art. 41. All UN member states are then bound to
accept and carry out the Security Council decision. Id. art. 25.
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a French DC-10 aircraft in an attack that killed 170 people.60 The de-
cision reversed a lower court ruling that had refused to recognize the
sitting Libyan leader’s head-of-state immunity.61 In Spain, the Na-
tional Court decided in 1999 that it had no authority to prosecute sit-
ting Cuban head of state Fidel Castro.62 Similarly, the United States
has denied immunity to former heads of state,63 but has never abro-
gated the immunity of a sitting head of state or head of government.64
Furthermore, even though some international agreements have called
for stripping away head-of-state immunity, and although some coun-
tries have considered taking jurisdiction over foreign leaders, it is sig-
nificant that no nation has yet gone so far as to actually pass judgment
against a sitting head of state.65
B. The ICJ’s Yerodia Arrest Warrant Decision
On April 11, 2000, a Belgian investigating judge issued an inter-
national arrest warrant in absentia against Abdulaye Yerodia Ndom-
basi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs.66 The warrant accused Yerodia of crimes against humanity and
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols for delivering speeches inciting racial hatred.67 Belgium as-
serted that it was exercising its universal jurisdiction to try interna-
tional crimes, and Belgian law did not recognize any special immuni-
60. Gadhafi Will Not Face Bomb Charge, CNN.com, at http://europe.cnn.com/2001/
WORLD/europe/france/03/13/crime.france.gaddafi/ (Mar. 14, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
61. Id.
62. Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 1012–13.
63. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. See Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 288, 296–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (recognizing
the immunity of Zimbabwe’s sitting president, Robert Mugabe); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp.
319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding sitting British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher immune from
suit in the United States).
65. Cf. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 43 (“[S]tate practice also includes omissions; many
rules of international law forbid states to do certain acts, and, when proving such a rule, it is
necessary to look not only at what states do, but also at what they do not do.”)
66. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 41 I.L.M. 536, 541 (2002).
67. Id.
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ties arising from any person’s capacity as a foreign official.68 The
Democratic Republic of the Congo in turn protested the arrest war-
rant’s validity under international law, and consequently brought pro-
ceedings against Belgium in the ICJ in the Hague.69 In addition to the
case against Yerodia, Belgium was also considering whether to put Is-
raeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein on trial for crimes against humanity.70
Considering the justifications for the head-of-state immunity
doctrine and recent state practice,71 the ICJ in the Yerodia case de-
clared that it “has been unable to deduce from this practice that there
exists under customary international law any form of exception to the
rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to
incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs.”72 The ICJ emphasized that
the nature of a head of state or foreign minister’s office requires him
to travel to other nations without apprehension that he could be ex-
68. Id. at 541–42. It is generally accepted that any state may try international crimes such as
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, or international terrorism—regardless
of (1) where the crime occurred; (2) the nationality of the defendant or the victim; and (3)
whether that state’s security interests are at stake—under the principle of universal jurisdiction.
See Osofsky, supra note 25, at 192 (“[U]niversal jurisdiction stems from the notion that some
international prohibitions are so important that a violation of them by anyone, anywhere, war-
rants any nation’s taking jurisdiction.”). However, there is no clear consensus regarding the
scope of the crimes that are subject to universal jurisdiction, or even regarding the definition of
some of these crimes. See id. at 198 (“[I]nternational consensus of universal jurisdiction exists
only with regard to a few norms . . . .”).
69. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 41 I.L.M. at 538.
70. Cuban Exiles Act Against Castro, CNN.com, at http://europe.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/
europe/10/04/belgium.castro/ (Oct. 4, 2001) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
71. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 41 I.L.M. at 551 (“The Court has carefully examined
State practice, including national legislation and those few decisions of national higher
courts . . . . The Court has also examined the rules concerning the immunity or criminal respon-
sibility of persons having an official capacity contained in the legal instruments creating interna-
tional criminal tribunals . . . .”).
72. Id. All exceptions to a nation’s complete territorial power must be traced back to state
consent, and for centuries all states have agreed not to subject foreign leaders to judicial process
within their territory. See Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812)
(“The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal inde-
pendence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other . . . sovereigns have
consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that ab-
solute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories . . . .”). Therefore, to change
the well-established custom of sitting head-of-state immunity states would have to consent to
the change, either by ratifying a treaty or by developing international customary law through
consistent state practice and a belief that this state practice reflects a new legal norm. See supra
notes 36–38 and accompanying text. Despite the existence of some state practice to the contrary,
for the most part, states have continued to assert that immunity for sitting heads of state, with
very limited exceptions, is essential to the proper functioning of international relations.
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posed to legal liability or criminal punishment.73 Consequently, a sit-
ting head of state’s immunity, unlike that of a former head of state,
cannot depend on whether the crime alleged involved his actions in a
private capacity or an official capacity.74
Rather, the ICJ observed that the only exceptions to a head of
state’s immunity under international law are: (1) that a head of state
is not immune under international law from process in his own coun-
try; (2) likewise, a head of state’s home country may waive his immu-
nity in foreign courts; (3) a former head of state is not immune for
acts committed before or after his period in office or for private acts
(including international crimes) committed while in office; and (4) a
head of state enjoys no immunity when that immunity has been val-
idly abrogated by an international tribunal.75
State practice since the ICJ’s decision demonstrates that states
have accepted the principles explained by the ICJ, substantially re-
solving years of confusion over the scope of head-of-state immunity
under international law. Most prominently, in response to the ICJ’s
opinion, the Belgian government retreated from any assertion that
putting a sitting foreign head of state on trial is justified under inter-
national law, and the Belgian judiciary has declared the case against
Ariel Sharon inadmissible.76 “The judgment is clear,” said Jan Devad-
der, a legal advisor in the Belgian Foreign Ministry. “The court has
73. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 41 I.L.M. at 549–50 (“In the performance of these
functions, [a head of state or foreign minister] is frequently required to travel internationally,
and thus must be in a position freely to do so whenever the need should arise.”).
74. Id. at 550.
75. Id. at 551–52. The ICJ lists the International Criminal Court as an example of a tribunal
that may validly abrogate a head-of-state’s immunity where it has jurisdiction. Id. at 552. How-
ever, it is important to recognize that such an assertion most likely holds true only with respect
to heads of state whose home country has assented to ICC jurisdiction. See supra notes 51–56
and accompanying text. The ICC derives its jurisdiction from authority delegated by member
states. Leaving aside the frequently debated question of whether states possess any power to
delegate their jurisdiction to other entities, it is clear that they may not delegate authority that
they do not possess in the first instance. See supra note 55. A head of state is not immune under
international law in the courts of his own nation, and a nation may waive the immunity of its
own head of state; therefore that state may be able to delegate its jurisdiction over its own head
of state to the ICC, or, alternatively, waive the head of state’s immunity in advance. However,
no other country has jurisdiction over a third party’s head of state, and, consequently, no two
states (or group of states) may agree by treaty to waive the immunity of a third party’s head of
state without that other nation’s consent. Therefore, the Rome Statute’s purported jurisdiction
over the heads of state of nonparties is best viewed as an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to
modify customary international law.
76. Belgium Bars Sharon War Crimes Trial, BBC News, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/
Europe/2066808.stm (Jun. 26, 2002) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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clearly ruled government leaders and heads of state enjoy total im-
munity from prosecution. The Sharon case, in my opinion, is closed.”77
III.  HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY UNDER U.S. LAW
Although some federal courts in the 1980s and 1990s had ad-
dressed questions of head-of-state immunity under U.S. law, all of
this case law predated the dramatic shift in the international law of
head-of-state immunity sparked by the high-profile Pinochet case.
Therefore, when the Mugabe case reached a federal district court in
New York, that court faced unresolved questions of whether the
American domestic law of head-of-state immunity is consistent with
the framework that was developing under international law, and if so,
how the two systems interact together.
A. The State of U.S. Law before the Mugabe Case
In the United States, the distinction between the law of head-of-
state immunity and the law of state sovereign immunity began to be
gradually recognized in the second half of the twentieth century.78 Af-
ter the Second World War, the United States decided to adopt the re-
strictive form of sovereign immunity, and the State Department noti-
fied the international community of this policy shift in the 1952 Tate
letter.79 However, Congress did not codify any comprehensive rules
outlining restrictive sovereign immunity until it approved the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in 1976.80 The FSIA allows Ameri-
can courts to take jurisdiction over foreign states in certain enumer-
ated actions, such as those involving commercial activities carried on
in the United States.81 The act defines a foreign state as including both
the state itself and its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumen-
talities, but it is noticeably silent with respect to foreign heads of
state.82
77. Andrew Osborn, Sharon Cannot Be Tried in Belgium, Says Court, GUARDIAN (Lon-
don), Feb. 15, 2002, at 20.
78. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 136–37 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing the
legislative history of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
79. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 270–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
80. Id. at 272–73.
81. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1602–1611 (2000).
82. Id. § 1603(a). An “agency or instrumentality of a foreign state” is further defined as any
entity that: (1) is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise; (2) is an organ of the state or
political subdivision, or is owned primarily by the state or political subdivision; and (3) is not a
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Since the FSIA was enacted, U.S. courts have consistently read it
to encompass only state sovereign immunity, and not foreign head-of-
state immunity.83 This interpretation is consistent with the legislative
history of the act, and it also recognizes the differing policy goals that
the two distinct forms of immunity address. Legislative history dem-
onstrates that the primary purpose of the FSIA was to provide for ju-
risdiction over foreign state-owned companies, which had become in-
creasingly influential in Communist countries; the act was never
intended to affect diplomats or heads of state.84 A Justice Department
official, Bruno Ristau, made this point clear during the congressional
hearings by affirming that the FSIA would allow U.S. courts to take
jurisdiction over the German state airline Lufthansa, but reminding
lawmakers that “we are not talking . . . in terms of permitting suit
against the Chancellor of the Federal Republic . . . . That is an alto-
gether different question.”85 The enactment of the FSIA signifies that
the United States recognizes sovereign immunity and head-of-state
immunity as distinct, though related, legal ideas.86
In the United States, although the law of diplomatic immunity is
governed by an international treaty and the law of state sovereign
immunity is governed by an act of Congress, the responsibility for de-
signing legal standards for resolving head-of-state immunity questions
has been left to the courts.87 However, U.S. courts have been reluctant
to play too great of a role in deciding when to hold foreign leaders ac-
countable for their acts, recognizing that the decision to deny the im-
munity of a foreign head of state can cause serious international po-
citizen of an American state and has not been created under the laws of any third country. Id. §
1603(b).
83. See Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 136 (“No case has, however, construed ‘agency or in-
strumentality’ [in § 1603 of the FSIA] to include a head-of-state.”).
84. See id. at 137 (discussing the purposes of the FSIA); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 12
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6610 (explaining that the FSIA was not “intended
to affect either diplomatic or consular immunity”).
85. Fitzgerald, supra note 24, at 1005 n.131 (quoting Immunities of Foreign States: Hearing
on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1976) (statement of Bruno Ristau, Chief, Foreign Liti-
gation Unit, Civil Division, Dept. of Justice)).
86. See Mallory, supra note 4, at 170–71 (contrasting head-of-state immunity, sovereign
immunity, and diplomatic immunity under U.S. law).
87. See supra notes 14–20 and accompanying text (discussing the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations); supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text (discussing the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act).
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litical ramifications.88 As the Second Circuit explained, “the judicial
branch is not the most appropriate one to define the scope of immu-
nity for heads-of-state . . . . [B]ecause the field of foreign relations is
largely confided to the President by Article II of the Constitution, the
executive branch naturally has greater experience and expertise in
this area.”89 When the executive branch decides that a foreign leader
ought to receive immunity, federal courts accept this determination as
binding, deeming it a nonjusticiable political question.90 Consequently,
the courts may explore the issue of how much immunity is enjoyed by
foreign heads of state only when the executive branch is silent.91 Still,
as the Supreme Court has long emphasized, “In the absence of recog-
nition of the claimed immunity by the political branch of the govern-
ment, the courts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites
of immunity exist.”92
In practice, the State Department has preempted the judiciary
from making immunity determinations for heads of state by filing
formal “suggestions of immunity” with the court, through the Justice
Department.93 The Supreme Court recognizes that these suggestions
are binding, stressing that the executive branch must be able to settle
certain claims through diplomatic channels, rather than through liti-
gation in the American courts.94 The State Department used to follow
88. See Doe v. United States, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that the executive
branch is better equipped than the judiciary to tackle problems that require flexible responses in
the interest of international comity).
89. Id.
90. Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) (“[T]he courts should not so act
as to embarrass the executive arm in its conduct of foreign affairs . . . . It is therefore not for the
courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit to allow . . . .”); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (explaining that the doctrine of nonjusticiability of political ques-
tions derives from the idea of separation of powers between the branches of government).
91. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34–35. Nevertheless, many courts have addressed this issue exten-
sively in dicta, even when deciding the case on the ground that the executive branch’s determi-
nation of the issue is not reviewable by the courts. E.g., Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d
259, 288–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). But see Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(requiring only one paragraph to dismiss claims against British Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher on the grounds that the State Department suggestion was conclusive).
92. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 34–35.
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2000) (providing that an officer of the Justice Department may
attend to the interests of the United States in any suit pending in a U.S. court).
94. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943) (deferring to the State Depart-
ment’s suggestion in the context of a sovereign immunity case before the enactment of the
FSIA); Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Even, however, if the
goal of the United States were less lofty, it would make no difference. In this matter the courts
are bound by executive decision.”).
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a similar procedure in sovereign immunity cases, but that process was
laid to rest by the FSIA.95 Because the FSIA addressed only the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, the practice of deferring completely to
State Department suggestions of head-of-state immunity continues.96
Although the executive branch often limits the courts’ power to
decide immunity issues, in the decades since the FSIA was enacted,
federal case law has addressed in a piecemeal fashion the approach
American courts will take when a justiciable head-of-state immunity
issue does arise. Consistent with the treatment required by interna-
tional law,97 American courts have not presumed to take jurisdiction
over current or former heads of state based on their public and offi-
cial acts.98 And from recent case law, one can discern that U.S. courts
will recognize the immunity of foreign heads of state for private unof-
ficial acts, even when the executive branch does not suggest immu-
nity, when three conditions are met: (1) the person seeking immunity
is a sitting head of state;99 (2) the United States recognizes that person
as the legitimate head of state;100 and (3) the foreign state has not
waived the immunity.101 This rule applies to all private activity, from
commercial behavior to international criminal offenses, and if any of
these three criteria is not met, then the defendant is not entitled to
immunity in U.S. courts.
In a series of high-profile federal cases, U.S. courts addressed
each of the conditions that must exist for a foreign leader to be im-
95. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (noting
that one of the FSIA’s principle purposes was to transfer sovereign immunity decisions from the
executive branch to the judicial branch); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that Congress has the power to
enlarge or contract the scope of the executive branch’s authority to a certain degree).
96. Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 137.
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
98. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining
that the act-of-state doctrine protects officials with sovereign authority acting in their official
capacity, but not officials acting privately for personal profit).
99. See id. (denying immunity to former Philippine head of state Ferdinand Marcos).
100. See United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying immu-
nity to Manuel Noriega, who served as the de facto leader of Panama although the United
States never recognized him as that nation’s legitimate leader). The court also justified its con-
clusion by noting that the executive branch’s decision to capture and prosecute Noriega neces-
sarily implied an unwillingness to then provide him with immunity. Id. at 1212.
101. See Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (grant-
ing immunity to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and recalling the long-standing practice of accord-
ing immunity to sitting heads of state of governments, as recognized by the United States, when
that immunity is not waived).
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mune in American courts, discussing the policy justifications served
by such rules. In 1994, the Ninth Circuit decided that former heads of
state enjoy no protection from lawsuits based on their private acts
committed while in office.102 The lawsuit alleged that, under the
authority of former Philippine head of state Ferdinand Marcos, Phil-
ippine military intelligence officials tortured, executed, or caused the
disappearance of up to ten thousand people.103 Recognizing that these
crimes could not be considered legitimate official acts, the court had
no trouble holding Marcos accountable for his private offenses.104 “He
was not the state, but the head of the state, bound by the laws that
applied to him,” the court declared.105 The court’s decision reflected
the fundamental purposes of the doctrine of head-of-state immunity
in light of the shift toward a restrictive form of state sovereign immu-
nity. As the restrictive sovereign immunity doctrine suggests, ac-
countability for private offenses like international crimes does not
unduly infringe upon state sovereignty interests. And once a head of
state is no longer in office, holding him responsible for his private acts
does not interfere with his nation’s ability to effectively engage in
diplomatic relations.106
In a 1997 criminal case against the former de facto dictator of
Panama, Manuel Noriega, the Eleventh Circuit held that a foreign
leader is not entitled to immunity in U.S. courts unless he is formally
recognized by the U.S. government.107 In 1988, Panama’s President
Eric Arturo Delvalle had removed Noriega from his post as com-
mander of Panama’s defense forces, and a struggle for power en-
sued.108 The legislature toppled Delvalle’s government, and Noriega
took effective control after a disputed presidential election.109 The
United States, however, recognized Guillermo Endara as the legiti-
102. In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1469–72. The State Department did not
intervene in the case, so the court was free to decide the immunity question under U.S. law.
103. Id. at 1469.
104. Id. at 1471.
105. Id. (quoting Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988)).
The Court also noted plaintiffs’ argument that, even if Marcos had been entitled to immunity, it
had been waived by the Philippine government, which had gone so far as to urge that the lawsuit
against Marcos should proceed. Id. at 1472 n.7. However, the Court indicated that it was unnec-
essary to reach the waiver issue because the case could be decided on other grounds. Id.
106. See id. at 1472 (determining that exercising jurisdiction in the lawsuit against Marcos
did not implicate foreign diplomatic concerns).
107. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
108. Id. at 1209–10.
109. Id. at 1210.
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mate constitutional head of state.110 In December 1989, Noriega an-
nounced that a state of war existed against the United States, and,
days later, the U.S. government responded with military force in an
effort to seize him.111 Noriega surrendered on January 3, 1990, and
American officials brought him to Florida to face drug charges.112 The
court rejected Noriega’s argument that he was entitled to head-of-
state immunity, noting that the United States had never recognized
him as a legitimate head of state.113
Likewise, an executive determination that a person is a head of
state is entitled to judicial recognition, even if that person cannot es-
tablish effective control of the nation.114 Haiti’s President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide was ousted in a military coup in 1991, but the
United States continued to recognize him as Haiti’s legitimate head of
state.115 President George Bush continued to refer to Aristide as
Haiti’s “duly elected President.”116 The next U.S. administration fol-
lowed suit, as President Bill Clinton described Aristide as “the demo-
cratically elected head of the Government of Haiti,”117 while he re-
mained in exile on American soil.118 Accordingly, a federal district
court sitting in New York dismissed a lawsuit against Aristide that
had accused him of orchestrating a political assassination, relying on
the concept that Aristide enjoyed head-of-state immunity under
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1212; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text. Similarly, the Second Cir-
cuit refused to grant immunity to Radovan Karadzic, the leader of a self-proclaimed republic
within Bosnia-Herzegovina called “Srpska,” in a suit alleging “genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity.” Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 236–37 (2d Cir. 1995). Srpska did establish
effective control over certain territory within Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the court did not look at
the qualifications for statehood under international law; rather it considered solely whether the
American executive branch deemed it proper to grant formal recognition. Id. at 237, 248. In
contrast, under international law, the question of what constitutes a state is not a subjective po-
litical determination, but an objective factual analysis. Id. at 244. International law recognizes
the existence of a state when it has a defined territory, a permanent population, effective gov-
ernment control over its territory and population, and the ability to carry on relations with other
states. Id.
114. Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131–32 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
115. Id. at 130.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 131.
118. Id. at 130.
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American law.119 Verifying that it is irrelevant whether a leader actu-
ally exercises de facto control, the court asserted that head-of-state
immunity extends to the person that the executive branch recognizes
as the legitimate head of state.120
The rule that only recognized heads of state are entitled to im-
munity limits the head-of-state immunity doctrine to situations in
which foregoing accountability furthers the dual purposes of respect-
ing state sovereign equality and protecting diplomatic functions.
When two governments cease to recognize one another, there is no
longer a need to foster bilateral diplomacy between them, because
diplomatic relations have already broken down completely. And
there is similarly no need for a government to take steps to promote
the sovereign equality of an entity that it does not even acknowledge
as a sovereign state by allowing its leader to escape responsibility for
private wrongful acts and international crimes. In the absence of an
actual diplomatic relationship between the United States and a for-
eign leader, the goals of head-of-state immunity cannot be considered
strong enough to outweigh the interests of justice.
American law has also consistently accepted the international
law concept that head-of-state immunity is a privilege granted to a
foreign state for the purpose of promoting international respect, di-
plomacy, and comity, not a power held by the individual leader.121
Therefore, a sitting head of state recognized by the executive branch
is not immune from U.S. jurisdiction if that immunity has been
waived by his home country.122 Abrogating immunity in the case of
waiver leaves the goals of promoting sovereign equality and diplo-
119. Id. It was sufficient to decide this case that the State Department entered a binding
suggestion of immunity on behalf of Aristide. Id. at 135. However, the court nevertheless eluci-
dated the rule regarding head-of-state immunity in U.S. courts, giving special attention to the
requirement that the person be recognized as a head of state by the executive branch. Id. at 132.
120. Id. at 132 (“Recognition of a government and its officers is the exclusive function of the
Executive Branch.”); see also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (deferring to the
executive branch’s recognition of the Soviet Union).
121. See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Doe, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Head-
of-state immunity is founded on the need for comity among nations and respect for the sover-
eignty of other nations . . . . Our view is that head-of-state immunity is primarily an attribute of
state sovereignty, not an individual right.”); see also Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F.
Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (granting immunity to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and suggest-
ing that Saudi Arabia had not waived that immunity).
122. See id. (describing the waiver rule as a long-standing principle of international law).
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macy intact, because it does not permit jurisdiction to be exercised
without the interested state’s consent.123
However, all of this domestic precedent predated the dramatic
shift in the law of head-of-state immunity under international law that
had taken place since the Pinochet case.124 As a result, the murky state
of the law of head-of-state immunity in the international sphere was
no clearer under domestic U.S. law, and in light of recent develop-
ments on the world stage, it remained uncertain whether U.S. courts
would adhere to the principles espoused in the Marcos, Noriega and
Aristide cases in the future.125 In the Mugabe case, a federal district
court for the first time was called upon to decide whether the recent
changes in the customary international law of head-of-state immu-
nity—such as the elimination of immunity of former heads of state for
international crimes and other private acts—would cause U.S. courts
to rethink their approach to the head-of-state immunity doctrine in
the domestic sphere.126
B. The District Court’s Mugabe Decision
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe visited New York in Sep-
tember of 2000 to meet with other diplomats and world leaders at the
United Nations Millennium Summit.127 During the trip, he held a rally
at a Harlem church in an attempt to drum up American popular sup-
port for his controversial policy of backing violent seizures of white-
owned farms in Zimbabwe.128 As President Mugabe arrived at the
123. In practice, it is extremely uncommon for a sitting head of state’s immunity to be
waived because he is often the person who has the power to control whether or not to issue a
waiver. This catch-22 is illustrated in the Aristide case. The de facto Haitian government sup-
ported the lawsuit and tried to waive Aristide’s immunity, but it was unable to do so because
Aristide represented the only Haitian government recognized by the United States; conse-
quently, only Aristide could waive his own immunity. See Lafontant, 844 F. Supp. at 134 (“Be-
cause the United States does not recognize the de facto government, that government does not
have the power to waive President Aristide’s immunity.”). In the days in which former heads of
state were immune from suits based on their private acts, waiver played a more potent role.
However, it is possible that waiver could arise again as a significant limit to the head-of-state
immunity doctrine, as precedents like the ICC raise the possibility that a state may waive its
leaders’ immunity in advance. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 35–59 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
126. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 278–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
127. Zimbabwe President Accused of Orchestrating Terror in U.S. Suit, CNN.com, at http://
www.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/africa/09/10/us.mugabesued.ap/ (Sept. 10, 2000) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
128. Id.
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church, he was served with a lawsuit129 alleging that he had organized
assassinations, torture, rapes, terrorism, and other acts of violence in
a campaign designed to quash his political opposition.130 The com-
plaint listed pages of specific instances of abuse against members of
the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),131
and accused President Mugabe of encouraging these crimes by re-
peatedly threatening violence against opponents of the ruling ZANU-
PF party.132 President Mugabe had allegedly warned MDC voters that
“my ghost will come after you,” and that “those who try to cause dis-
unity among our people must watch out because death will befall
them.”133
In the Mugabe case, the U.S. State Department submitted an of-
ficial suggestion to the court declaring that President Mugabe should
be entitled to head-of-state immunity in U.S. courts.134 The suggestion
stressed that putting President Mugabe on trial would be incompati-
ble with America’s foreign policy goals.135 Although the Mugabe court
went on to discuss the domestic and international law of head-of-state
immunity in detail, it recognized that no American court has ever ig-
nored a State Department request for immunity for a head of state,136
and acknowledged that no act of Congress has overturned this long-
129. Id.
130. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 265.
131. Id. at 266.
132. Id. at 266–67.
133. Complaint at ¶¶ 52(a), 52(b), Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(No. 00-6666). The complaint also detailed a number of violent threats made by Mugabe’s sub-
ordinates and other leaders of the ruling party, including Defense Minister Moven Mahachi and
Zimbabwe War Veterans Association President Chenjerayi Hunzvi, who is called by his
adopted middle name “Hitler.” Id. at ¶¶ 4, 50. For example, Mahachi reportedly told voters at a
village meeting that “if you are going to vote for MDC we will see what you have voted for, be-
cause we will have machines in these polling stations. After the election we will move around
from door to door at every house beating you.” Id. at ¶ 50(e).
134. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 267.
135. Id. However, some voices within the U.S. government expressed a different view. For
instance, U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde warned against using the doctrine of head-of-state
immunity to assist a political regime that denied basic democratic rights to its own people. See
Henry J. Hyde, U.S. Shouldn’t Rush to Protect Mugabe, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 19, 2001, at 19. (“The
State Department must be careful that its desire to support the tradition of reciprocal diplo-
matic immunity does not lend aid and comfort to a brutal regime’s political war on its own citi-
zens.”).
136. See Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 294–95 (citing Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F.
Supp. 793, 797–98 (N.D. Cal. 1987), as the only instance in which a court has refused to follow a
State Department suggestion, a case involving not a head of state, but rather a foreign state’s
solicitor general).
TUNKSEDITS.DOC 03/31/03 9:37 AM
2002] DIPLOMATS OR DEFENDANTS? 675
standing practice.137 The State Department’s determination that
granting President Mugabe immunity served American foreign policy
interests was therefore wholly conclusive.
Nevertheless, the Mugabe court proceeded to address the dra-
matic changes that had recently taken place in the law of head-of-
state immunity, both on the domestic and international fronts. Sig-
nificantly, the court emphasized that the American domestic law of
head-of-state immunity is distinct from the related concepts of state
sovereign immunity and diplomatic immunity, though the three doc-
trines do share some of the same aims. As the court explained, “sub-
stantial case law has begun to develop, identifying issues singularly
associated with head-of-state immunity and demanding treatment
under a set of rules reflecting that uniqueness.”138 Bringing together
and reaffirming the precedent previously established in U.S. courts,
the Mugabe court held that head-of-state immunity applies under
U.S. law only to recognized foreign leaders when the immunity is not
waived by the state.139 Moreover, the court noted that the interna-
tional law and American domestic law of head-of-state immunity are
consistent with one another. “Importantly, to some degree, progres-
sion in the international sphere either mirrors or has been driven by
comparable evolution of principles on the domestic front,” the court
observed.140
Applying the principles recognized by the Mugabe court, it is
evident that President Mugabe would have been entitled to head-of-
state immunity even if the executive branch had not pressed for it.
President Mugabe served as the sitting head of state of Zimbabwe, he
was recognized as a head of state by the United States government,
and Zimbabwe had not waived his immunity. Therefore, he was enti-
tled to travel to the United States without apprehension that he could
be placed on trial for his private acts, including even serious violations
of international criminal law.141
137. See id. at 288 (describing the role of State Department suggestions in the “emerging
consensus” regarding the American law of head-of-state immunity).
138. Id. at 277.
139. Id. at 292 (“As Noriega and Aristide demonstrate, head-of-state immunity is an attrib-
ute of state sovereignty, not an individual right . . . . [H]ead-of-state status requires a formal act
of recognition by the Executive Branch, and only officials so recognized can claim entitlement
to the corresponding privileges and immunities.”).
140. Id. at 280.
141. The court went on to hold that Mugabe’s head-of-state immunity did not also vest im-
munity in the ZANU-PF political party that he controlled, and that it was valid to give the po-
litical party notice of the suit through the service of process on Mugabe, the party’s first secre-
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IV.  THE NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE LAW OF
HEAD-OF-STATE IMMUNITY
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, American courts and
international courts are essentially in agreement as to when a state’s
courts are required to recognize the immunity of foreign heads of
state. Consistent with the framework articulated by the ICJ, U.S.
courts will grant a recognized sitting foreign leader immunity, absent
waiver by the foreign state. Significantly, international law also per-
mits states the discretion to grant foreign leaders a greater degree of
immunity, and the United States has placed the responsibility for de-
termining when to exercise this discretion in the hands of the execu-
tive branch. This framework leaves U.S. policymakers substantial
flexibility in seeking accountability though political means, and fur-
thers the purposes of the head-of-state immunity doctrine by elimi-
nating the chilling effect on diplomacy that stems from uncertainty
about the legal scope of head-of-state immunity.
A. The Legal Pedigree
To a large extent, the Yerodia and Mugabe courts harmonized
the international and domestic law of head-of-state immunity, forging
a coherent framework that protects the functional purpose of immu-
nity while leaving open ways of attaining accountability for interna-
tional crimes. Both courts upheld the basic doctrine that sitting heads
of state and other top state officials enjoy absolute immunity while in
office, unless the immunity is waived by the state. Both clearly laid
out consistent standards governing when a state’s former leaders are
entitled to receive immunity in foreign courts, substantially clarifying
the law in this once cloudy area.142 Furthermore, both endorsed head-
of-state immunity primarily on grounds mirroring the functional pur-
poses of diplomatic immunity, according substantially less weight to
other historical justifications rooted in the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity and the notion of sovereign equality. In drawing this dis-
tinction, the decisions explain why some aspects of head-of-state im-
munity have been abandoned in the name of accountability for inter-
national crimes, whereas others must be retained to promote
international discourse and diplomacy.
tary. Id. at 307–09. Because ZANU-PF, like Mugabe, refused to appear before the court, the
court entered a default judgment against ZANU-PF and ordered the case referred to a magis-
trate judge to determine damages. Id. at 318.
142. See supra notes 71–75, 97–101, 138–141 and accompanying text.
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The concept of restrictive sovereign immunity has accepted the
notion that seeking accountability for international crimes and other
unofficial acts does not undermine the principles of sovereign equal-
ity and independence. Therefore, the doctrine of head-of-state immu-
nity must also accept that these goals are no longer sufficient to justify
awarding immunity to heads of state. Instead, head-of-state immunity
for international crimes is now justifiable primarily to protect world
leaders’ ability to effectively carry out their diplomatic functions. As
the Mugabe court explained, “If there is a larger end here to be
served, for which accusations of grave misconduct as between par-
ticular individuals may be momentarily set aside, it is in the interest of
comity among nations—to safeguard friendly relations between sov-
ereign states.”143 Because neither former heads of state nor leaders
who are not recognized by the United States have essential diplo-
matic interests that require free travel in the United States, they are
not entitled to the immunity afforded to recognized sitting foreign
leaders in American courts.144
In contrast, protecting the inviolability of sitting heads of state
for both public and private acts is still consistent with the fundamen-
tal justifications for the head-of-state immunity doctrine. A rule en-
suring that a nation’s leader is not put on trial for official public acts
respects that nation’s sovereign equality and prevents other states
from using their judiciaries to influence another nation’s legitimate
political decisions. These are goals that are still ardently endorsed
under the restrictive form of sovereign immunity.145 Furthermore, pro-
tecting sitting heads of state from foreign jurisdiction even with re-
spect to private acts helps world leaders freely engage in their unique
diplomatic functions.146 A strong form of immunity for sitting heads of
143. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 317.
144. Likewise, the ICJ reasoned that even “the mere risk that, by travelling to or transiting
another State a Minister for Foreign Affairs might be exposing himself or herself to legal pro-
ceedings could deter the Minister from travelling internationally when required to do so for the
purposes of the performance of his or her official functions.” Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Congo v. Belg.), 41 I.L.M. 536, 550 (2002).
145. See supra notes 7–12 and accompanying text.
146. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Heads of state must
be able to freely perform their duties at home and abroad without the threat of civil and crimi-
nal liability in a foreign legal system.”); Mallory, supra note 4, at 193 (“Compelling reasons exist
for according heads of state a greater degree of immunity . . . . [H]eads of state often perform
diplomatic and political functions when in the United States, and as ceremonial and governmen-
tal representatives of their states, they are entitled to a degree of immunity consistent with their
official status.”).
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state therefore helps encourage productive international relations by
promoting travel and discourse between sovereign nations.
B. Seeking Accountability: Legal and Political Options
As the Yerodia and Mugabe cases indicate, it is now clear that
the head-of-state immunity doctrine requires states to respect the in-
violability of sitting state leaders. However, this framework leaves
states a great deal of political discretion to determine whether to ex-
ercise jurisdiction over others who formerly would have enjoyed im-
munity, such as former heads of state accused of international crimes.
In these cases, states now have the political flexibility to seek civil and
criminal accountability when they deem it appropriate to do so.
Continuing to recognize the immunity of sitting heads of state
comes with a cost: under some circumstances the immunity doctrine
can restrict victims’ access to the courts, and it may give human rights
violators an incentive to hold onto power.147 But upon deeper analysis,
it may be that in practice these costs are not so great as they initially
appear. It is not at all clear that the alternative—further eroding the
concept of head-of-state immunity—would have any appreciable im-
pact on efforts to bring the perpetrators of international crimes to jus-
tice. The framework crystallized in the Yerodia and Mugabe decisions
strikes a responsible balance that allows states to pursue accountabil-
ity in many circumstances, but stops short of creating jurisdiction over
foreign leaders that those leaders could easily avoid.
Although it is possible (though far from certain) that a sudden
shift in the law might allow U.S. courts initially to render judgments
against a few unwary head-of-state defendants, it is highly doubtful
that this course would bear fruit as a long-term strategy for holding
accountable heads of state who perpetrate genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, or similar atrocities. Just as many heads of
state recently became leery about setting foot in Belgian territory,148 if
the United States elected (in violation of international law) to open
its courts as a forum to try world leaders for international crimes,
then those leaders who have something to fear could simply avoid
trial by refusing to risk travel to the United States, even for diplo-
matic functions. Stripping away sitting-head-of-state immunity for
147. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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private acts probably would not increase accountability but rather de-
crease the use of diplomatic channels.
Moreover, the international law of head-of-state immunity af-
fords national legal systems the flexibility to grant a greater degree of
immunity to foreign heads of state and other top officials, either as a
domestic legal rule or on a case-by-case basis pursuant to political de-
cisionmaking.149 Under this framework, states may fashion targeted
case-specific strategies to prevent human rights violators from cling-
ing to power to avoid trial. For example, the executive branch could
agree to recognize an amnesty agreement as part of a negotiated tran-
sition of power to a friendly regime. This approach interacts well with
the United States’ presumptively political approach to head-of-state
immunity questions, in which the executive branch may make binding
suggestions of immunity. As former U.S. Ambassador for War
Crimes Issues David Scheffer explains, “Immunity may be the rogue
elephant at the party, but a rogue we may come to appreciate to es-
tablish greater ability for international politics to function.”150
In addition, the modern framework for deciding head-of-state
immunity questions contains a number of methods to improve ac-
countability while still promoting friendly diplomatic ties: “It is well
to consider also that justice and injustice, paired like strands of life,
normally travel hand in hand, their union joined in direct propor-
tion . . . . The greater the wrong, the louder the cry for right to be re-
quited.”151 While respecting the functional need for head-of-state im-
munity, the framework articulated by the Yerodia and Mugabe courts
provides nations with several ways to seek accountability from par-
ticular violators of fundamental human rights norms.
First, it is important to remember that the head-of-state immu-
nity doctrine does not give sitting heads of state the power to act out-
side the law.152 Instead, it places procedural restrictions on when other
149. For a discussion of when national courts may exercise jurisdiction, see supra Part II.B.
150. David Scheffer, Universal Jurisdiction: Myths, Realities, and Prospects, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 233, 239 (2001).
151. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that the law of
head-of-state immunity is capable of changing to respond to injustice, and observing that “the
vanguard of the law should stand ready to adapt as appropriate, to shape redress and remedy so
as to answer measure for measure the particular evil it pursues”).
152. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing
that Marcos, even while in power as the head of state, was “bound by the laws that applied to
him”).
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states are permitted to bring them to justice.153 As the ICJ empha-
sized, “Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain
period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to
whom it applies from all criminal responsibility.”154 Once a foreign
leader who has committed international crimes leaves office or is
forced from power, he no longer enjoys the protections of head-of-
state immunity for those crimes under international or U.S. law.
Second, acting in concert with other major powers, the United
States could support stripping away the immunity of certain sitting
heads of state on an ad hoc basis under the Chapter VII authority of
the UN Security Council. Strategies under Chapter VII could include
establishing an international tribunal empowered to try heads of
state, following the example of the ICTY and ICTR, or authorizing
states to try particular alleged human rights violators and war crimi-
nals in their domestic courts.155 Unlike efforts to make systematic
changes in the law, these political options would require neither a
new treaty nor a change in international custom.
Finally, in extreme cases, the United States may elect to revoke
official diplomatic recognition from certain world leaders or regimes
that have committed particularly heinous international crimes,
meaning that those leaders would no longer be entitled to head-of-
state immunity in American courts. Such a course of action would es-
sentially operate like a persona non grata rule,156 abrogating a foreign
leader’s immunity in advance at the cost of disturbing diplomatic rela-
tions with that particular country, and not necessarily with the entire
international community. Although such a step would carry dramatic
political consequences, such consequences would be less severe than
if the United States simply purported to subject recognized foreign
leaders to its criminal justice process without warning. National po-
litical branches would have the flexibility to weigh the costs and bene-
fits of such a course of action on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis.
153. See Tachiona, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (noting that, under the immunity doctrine, the
head of state’s offenses are not forgiven, but merely set aside momentarily).
154. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 41 I.L.M. 536, 551 (2002).
155. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
156. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 14, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. at
3233–34, 500 U.N.T.S. at 102. The Vienna Convention allows receiving states to declare a for-
eign diplomat persona non grata. Id. In response, the sending state must recall that diplomat
within a reasonable time period, or else the receiving state may refuse to recognize him as an
immune member of the diplomatic mission. Id.
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C. The Benefits of Legal Certainty
The framework that has emerged for settling questions of head-
of-state immunity also promises to put an end to the lack of stability
and predictability that has plagued the head-of-state immunity doc-
trine in recent years. The recent confusion over the scope of head-of-
state immunity has itself hindered the diplomatic purposes underlying
that doctrine.157 For head-of-state immunity to accomplish its goal of
encouraging diplomatic discourse, world leaders must be able to rely
on a stable and predictable legal rule.158 Uncertainty in this area of the
law can shut down diplomatic channels just as surely as actual erosion
of the immunity traditionally afforded to a state’s highest leaders.
For this reason, the United States should endorse the framework
articulated in the Yerodia and Mugabe cases as a stable and lasting
customary rule. As the ICJ explained in the Yerodia Arrest Warrant
case, the state practice that currently exists supporting further erosion
of the head-of-state immunity doctrine is not strong enough to de-
velop new customary law.159 However, if states continue to whittle
away at head-of-state immunity in spite of the ICJ’s opinion, the
scope of immunity enjoyed by world leaders could once again be cast
into doubt. By following the precedent established in Mugabe, the
U.S. judicial branch can create state practice solidifying the current
customary framework. The executive branch should follow suit by
endorsing the framework articulated in Yerodia and Mugabe and by
denouncing any deviation from that framework by foreign states.
Moreover, the United States ought to encourage codification of the
current customary framework in an international treaty to ensure the
continued stability and predictability of the head-of-state immunity
doctrine in its current form.
A law of head-of-state immunity mired in confusion and insta-
bility is powerless to achieve its diplomatic objectives. The framework
reflected in the Yerodia and Mugabe cases promises to resolve that
confusion, restoring the head of immunity doctrine as an effective
157. See Keinon, supra note 31, at 4A (discussing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s re-
luctance to travel to certain countries to avoid the possibility of being subjected to jurisdiction
there).
158. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible
Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 (1989) (noting that, when diplomatic
functions are involved, “each state knows that it will occupy both roles [that is, the roles of both
sending and receiving state] at all times and . . . consistency and predictability seem to serve all
states’ interests”).
159. See supra notes 48–59, 71–75 and accompanying text.
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means of promoting international diplomacy. U.S. policymakers must
recognize, however, that this promise could be lost if states do not ac-
tively support this framework through state practice and resist any at-
tempts by other states to modify it.
CONCLUSION
The Mugabe court held that head-of-state immunity prevented it
from forcing Zimbabwe’s president to answer allegations of murder,
torture, and terrorism.160 The court, however, also tried to assure the
victims of international crimes that all is not lost.161 Such tension in the
law of head-of-state immunity has sparked intense debate in recent
years about how best to balance the fundamental values of sover-
eignty, diplomacy, and justice. American and international courts re-
sponsibly resolved the dispute by forging a system in which immunity
both retains its crucial role in international diplomacy and coexists
with mechanisms that allow nations to seek accountability for interna-
tional crimes regardless of the status of the perpetrator. Because un-
certainty has traditionally haunted head-of-state immunity doctrine,
the United States should continue to work both domestically and
abroad to reinforce this framework as a lasting solution.
160. Tachiona v. Mugabe, 169 F. Supp. 2d 259, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
161. See id. at 317 (“[T]he day does come to pass when those who violate their public trust
are called upon, in this world, to render account for the wrongs they inflict on innocents.”).
